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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
CLARENCE J. FRANKLIN,

Case No. 960161-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Clarence J. Franklin ("Appellant" or
"Franklin") refers this Court to the Jurisdictional Statement,
Statement of the Issue, Text of Determinative Statutes, Statement
of the Case, Statement of the Facts, and Argument in his opening
brief.

Appellant replies as follows.

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE CRIME "BRANDISHING" A WEAPON CONTAINS
THE SAME ELEMENTS AS AGGRAVATED ASSAULT UNDER
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.
The State is correct that in State v. Verdin, 595 P.2d
862 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the
crimes of aggravated assault and drawing or exhibiting a weapon
in a threatening manner contain identical elements.

With very

little discussion, the Court concluded that in the context of
that case aggravated assault and exhibiting a weapon involved
different crimes.

The Court stated:

Credible evidence in this case establishes all
the elements of the higher crime, i.e., that
Verdin aimed a deadly weapon, a loaded rifle, at
a police officer, worked the action to put a

shell into a firing chamber, and attempted to
pull the trigger while declaring his intention to
"smoke" the officer. This is quite a different
and more reprehensible course of action than
exhibiting a dangerous weapon in a threatening
manner.
Id. at 863.

While Verdin does support the State's position, it

is distinguishable in that the evidence in this case does not
establish that Franklin aimed a loaded weapon, Franklin's alleged
threat was a more general statement in the midst of profanities
which apparently was not construed as a threat since David and/or
Josh moved closer to Franklin after the statement, Franklin did
not embellish on the threat by working the action, and Franklin
did not pull the trigger while making a direct threat.

Instead,

according to the State's witnesses, Franklin's hand was hanging
out the car window with a gun in it; he pointed the gun, which
David initially thought was a toy, at David.

R. 234-37.

Then

"he jumped back . . . closed the door and said, 'Let's go.'"
R. 237-38.
In State v. Oldrovd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984), the Utah
Supreme Court considered whether the trial court erred in
refusing to give the defendant's requested lesser included
offense instruction for exhibition of a deadly weapon in a
threatening manner.

The Court pointed out that the test for

determining whether a lesser included offense instruction which
is requested by a defendant must be given is whether there is
"some overlapping of the statutory elements of the offenses."
Id. at 553.

The crimes of aggravated assault and exhibiting a

deadly weapon have elements in common since "[b]oth require a
2

form of threat and both require the use of a weapon."
554.

Id. at

The Oldroyd Court clarified its holding in Verdin, stating:
The [Verdin] Court affirmed the conviction and
sentence for aggravated assault, saying that the
evidence in the case established all the elements
of the higher crime and that under the facts of
that case the distinction in the level of
proscribed conduct was clear.

Id. (emphasis added).

The Oldroyd Court further noted that

in Verdin [the evidence] clearly established all
of the elements of aggravated assault: Verdin
used a deadly weapon (a loaded rifle) in making a
threat to do bodily injury to another (declaring
his intention to "smoke" the police officer),
accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence (working the rifle action to put a shell
in the firing chamber and attempting to pull the
trigger while aiming the rifle at the police
officer).
Id. at 555.
In the present case, the distinction between the two
crimes is not as clear as it was in Verdin; indeed, under these
facts, identical elements support both crimes.

Both crimes

involve "a form of threat and both require the use of a weapon."
Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 554.

Neither Verdin nor Oldroyd expressly

make the distinction drawn by the State that aggravated assault
requires a threat of bodily injury whereas the crime of
brandishing a weapon occurs when the weapon is merely displayed,
and "[t]he defendant may be guilty of threatening even though
there is no threat made or intended."

State's brief at 12.

In

fact, Oldrovd appears to contradict this claim by the State since
it expressly states that both crimes involve a "form of threat."
Oldrovd, 685 P.2d at 554.
3

Additionally, the State does not clarify whether its
claimed distinction requires an express threat to do bodily
injury or whether implied threats based on the use of a dangerous
weapon are sufficient to elevate the crime from the crime of
brandishing to the crime of aggravated assault.

Neither statute

explicitly requires an express threat, and an express threat to
do harm presumably would be a "form of threat" which would fit
the requirements of either statute.

Additionally, any time a gun

is drawn or exhibited in an angry or threatening manner, a threat
to do bodily injury is implied.

Hence, drawing a gun in an angry

or threatening manner would be a "form of threat" under either
statute.

In this case, where witnesses testified that Franklin

pointed a gun while voicing a threat, the statutes required
identical elements.
The immediate show of force which was present in Verdin
where the defendant "work[ed] the rifle action to put a shell in
the firing chamber and attempt[ed] to pull the trigger while
aiming the rifle at the police officer" (Oldrovd, 685 P.2d at
551) is not present in this case.

Accordingly, the conviction

for aggravated assault should be reversed and judgment entered
for threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in fight or
quarrel, a class A misdemeanor.

CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Clarence J. Franklin respectfully
requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this
4

case for resentencing on the charge of threatening with or using
a dangerous weapon in fight or quarrel, a class A misdemeanor.
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